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As street-level bureaucrats, poll workers bear the primary responsibility for implementing voter identification
requirements. Voter identification requirements are not implemented equally across groups of voters, and poll
workers exercise substantial discretion in how they apply election law. In states with minimal and varying
identification requirements, poll workers appear to treat especially minority voters differently, requesting more
stringent voter identification. We explain why poll workers are different from other street-level bureaucrats and
how traditional mechanisms of control have little impact on limiting poll-worker discretion. We test why many poll
workers appear not to follow the law using a post-election survey of New Mexico poll workers. We find little
evidence that race, training, or partisanship matters. Instead, poll worker attitudes toward photo-identification
policies and their educational attainment influences implementation of voter-identification laws.
A
s street-level bureaucrats, poll workers bear
the primary responsibility for implementing
voter-identification requirements mandated
by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) or by state
and local governments.1 Currently, about 29 states
require some identification process, with 12 states
requiring photo identification. Studies of poll-worker
discretion find voter ID laws are often not adminis-
tered equally across racial and gender groups, but
existing literature has not clearly explained why voter
ID laws are inconsistently applied (Ansolabehere
2009; Atkeson et al. 2010; Cobb et al. 2012), which
is the concern of this study.
The street-level bureaucracy literature has not
generally considered the particular problems facing
election administrators (cf. Alvarez and Hall 2006).
Previous research on street-level bureaucrats focuses
on permanent employees (e.g., Lipsky 1980; Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2003), while the street-level
bureaucrats of elections are temporary employees who
create a particular set of problems for the local election
official (LEO). Furthermore, mechanisms of control to
reduce discretion and ensure street-level bureaucrats
do not ‘‘shirk’’ or ‘‘sabotage’’ particular policies have
limited applicability for poll workers because of the
short term of their employment and limited oppor-
tunity for the development of shared norms or
organization structure (Brehm and Gates 1997; Meyers
and Vorsanger 2003). Finally, the street-level bureau-
cracy literature largely shares the norm that discretion
is a valuable tool for street-level bureaucrats to ensure
responsiveness and effectiveness. However, when deal-
ing with voting rights, it is not clear that poll-worker
discretion can have positive consequences. We con-
tribute to the literature on street-level bureaucracy by
addressing how variation in the terms of employment
alters the ability to control discretion.
We address these important issues using data
from a survey of randomly selected New Mexico poll
workers, across four counties, in the November 2008
election. We supplement the poll-worker survey with
observational data from the same election and same
counties across over 200 New Mexico precincts and
a 2008 post-election voter survey. We find evidence
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 76, No. 4, October 2014, Pp. 944–957 doi:10.1017/S0022381614000528
 Southern Political Science Association, 2014 ISSN 0022-3816
1An online appendix with supplementary material for this article is posted at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000528. Data and
supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results will be made available at dataverse (www.thedata.org) upon publication.
944
that the state’s voter identification law is routinely
not followed. We then consider whether poll-worker
training, demographic characteristics, and attitudes
of the poll workers can explain the variation in
application of the voter identification law and find
poll-worker attitudes about voter identification and
poll-worker education levels largely explain variation
in implementation and consider the implications of
our study on public policy.
Previous Research on Voter
Identification
The debate over the implementation of state voter
identification laws first focused on its relationship to
turnout. At present, this research is inconclusive:
some have found that voter identification laws have
no effect on turnout at either the aggregate or
individual level (Lott 2006; Mycoff, Wagner, and
Wilson 2007), while others have found that strict
voter identification laws decrease turnout among
certain segments of the population (Alvarez, Bailey,
and Katz 2011; Alvarez, Katz, and Bailey 2007; Hood
and Bullock 2012; Vercellotti and Anderson 2006).
Among the latter set of studies, there is debate on
whether these laws disproportionately effect minori-
ties and which forms of voter identification require-
ments significantly reduce turnout (Alvarez, Katz,
and Bailey 2007; Hood and Bullock 2012; Vercellotti
and Anderson 2006).
More recently, scholars have examined the pro-
cedural consequences of voter identification laws and
whether identification laws are administered equally
across different social groups. This is an important
question because, historically, laws like these have
been used to create barriers to participation and have
been implemented unequally across segments of the
voting population (Keyssar 2000). In the case of voter
identification, the effects on minorities might be
subtle because these laws may not directly result
in observable changes in turnout but may affect
increases in provisional voting or voter confidence.
Recent voter studies in New Mexico in 2006 and
2008 found significant variation in the application
of identification requirements; Hispanic, male, and
Election Day voters were more likely to be asked
for photo identification when none was required
(Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2013; Atkeson, Alvarez,
and Hall 2010; Atkeson et al. 2010). Other state and
national studies showed minorities, both blacks and
Hispanics, were more likely than whites to report
showing identification (Ansolabehere 2009; Cobb et al.
2012). In addition, an observational study in Los
Angeles found that 29% of poll workers incorrectly
indicated to observers that it was the law in California
to show photo identification, and a significantly
greater percentage of poll workers who worked in
precincts with higher concentrations of minorities
made such claims (Barreto, Cohen-Marks, and Woods
2009). Studies also found that states with minimal
voter identification laws were more likely to have
variation in the implementation of voter identification
across racial groups with blacks and Hispanics more
likely to indicate they showed identification more
frequently than whites (Alvarez et al. 2010; Atkeson
et al. 2010).
Poll Workers as Street-Level
Bureaucrats
The concept of street-level bureaucrat refers to public
servants with a high degree of discretion in their
duties, who enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from
administrative officials, and are directly involved in
delivering services to citizens (Lipsky 1980, 13–16).
Even though they are temporary employees, poll
workers meet the criteria of street-level bureaucrats
possessing power, authority, discretion, and auton-
omy. For example, Alvarez and Hall (2006) argue poll
workers have tremendous autonomy and the GAO
noted that poll workers have ‘‘the final authority on
interpreting guidance in areas such as deciding who
can vote and determining voter intent’’ (2001, 160).
Because there are often hundreds or even thousands
of voting locations in an urban county, oversight by
election officials is very difficult, and problem solving
is often delayed by hours as local election officials
respond to voter or observer complaints. This
authority, and absence of oversight, as a street-
level bureaucrat allows poll workers the discretion
to resolve problems as they see fit and make final
decisions at the polls leading to various principal-
agent problems (Alvarez and Hall 2006; MacDonald
and Cain 2005).
The street-level bureaucracy literature does not
adequately speak to the use of temporary workers as
is common in election administration. Election
administrators often rely on temporary workers to
run the polls, to recount ballots, and to perform
election audits. Scholars of street-level bureaucracy
focus primarily on teachers, social-service workers,
and police officers who work within permanent
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organizations, generally depend upon their positions
for their primary source of income, and must rely on
discretion to effectively deliver the services they are
required to provide (Maynard-Moody and Musheno
2003; Vinzant and Crothers 1998). By contrast, poll
workers are temporary workers who, at most, work
only a few days a year, and many work only a few
elections before they retire.2 Because they are temp-
orary workers, poll workers are not likely to be part
of the organizational culture of election administra-
tors and, unlike teachers and police officers, are less
likely to have shared norms or conformity (Meyers
and Vorsanger 2003; Wilkins and Williams 2008).
This temporary status heightens agency problems and
enhances the discretion of poll workers.
Influence of Beliefs and Identities on
Decision Making
Research on street-level bureaucrats helps to explain
the decision-making and task environment faced by
poll workers (e.g., Hall, Monson, and Patterson
2009). When rules and procedures are straightfor-
ward, easy to follow and applicable to the situation at
hand, it is more likely that street-level bureaucrats
will follow the rules and limit their discretion. In
contrast, complex rules and procedures often increase
discretion (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 93;
Meyers and Vorsanger 2003). For poll workers, the
level of complexity of voter-identification require-
ments is likely to influence the extent of poll-worker
discretion. Evidence suggests that discretion is enhanced,
and implementation problematic, when laws are com-
plicated and provide multiple ways in which a voter
can be identified or provide different identification
requirements for different types of voters.
New Mexico, the case studied here, has a compli-
cated voter identification law that allows voters to
choose the way in which they are identified, but legally
each voter must present a verbal or written form of
identification. About 16 states have similar laws or
only HAVA-compliant voter ID requirements. In New
Mexico, the minimum identification required under
state law in 2008 was for each voter to state her name,
registration address, and birth year. Voters could
also choose to show a physical form of identifica-
tion, such as a voter registration card, driver’s
license, or utility bill. If the voter opted for a
photographic identification, it did not have to
contain the voter’s address; if the voter opted for a
nonphoto form of identification, the document had
to include an address, but it did not have to match
the voter registration rolls.3 In addition, the election
context for voter identification laws is complicated.
The city of Albuquerque, which is located in
Bernalillo County and is the largest city in New Mexico,
offered a voter referendum that easily passed in 2005,
which required all voters to show photo identification
in city elections, but was not implemented until the
fall of 2009. Differences across jurisdictional contexts
likely increase discrepancies and confusion related to
the law and its implementation.
In addition, the extent of discretion available to
poll workers may vary by voting mode. Early voting
and vote centers reduce the number of polling places
and hence poll workers, making it easier for election
administrators to supervise poll-worker behavior and
select higher-quality poll workers. Moreover, in the
case of early voting and its extended time frame,
election administrators have the ability to exert
greater control over poll workers and administer
sanctions to address any complaints brought by staff,
observers, or voters. In New Mexico, early voters
were given a small form that asked for name,
registration address, and birth year, all of the require-
ments necessary for voter identification under the
law. Nevertheless, some early voters indicated they
were still asked for photo identification. However,
given the differences in oversight and repeated
exposure to election rules that early voting provides,
we hypothesize:
H1: Poll workers will be less likely to incorrectly ask
voters for identification during early voting compared
to Election Day voting.
In contrast, there are numerous ways in which poll
workers exercise their discretion on Election Day.4
They decide the precinct set-up, providing voters
with more or less privacy. They encourage or dis-
courage the use of machines designed to aid minority
voters needing language assistance and voters with
disabilities that prevent them from voting a normal
ballot. They determine the process for checking in,
getting a ballot, and placing it into the machine. They
also often determine at the end of the day voter intent
for ballots with write-in votes. However, the most
2Six percent of poll workers indicated this was their first election;
another 36% worked two; 31% worked between three and five;
17% worked between six and 10; and 10% worked more than
10 lections.
3x 1-1-24 NMSA 1978.
4There are some limits to discretion including other poll workers,
poll watchers, and observers. Nevertheless, presiding judges have
the final say in the polling place.
946 lonna rae atkeson et al.
important decision poll workers make in their direct
interactions with voters is deciding whether or not
a person is an eligible voter—whether they have the
appropriate identification or not, and consequently
whether they will get a regular ballot, a provisional
ballot, or no ballot at all.
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, 3–7) argue
street-level workers not only rely on rules and proce-
dures to make decisions but also on their own value
systems and their judgments of the citizen with whom
they are interacting. According to this perspective,
street-level workers project an identity upon a citi-
zen-client, leading the worker to determine the
worthiness of the client and thus which rules and
procedures are applied to provide service to him
based upon the worker’s value system (93–94,
154–55). In the extreme, this sort of decision making
can lead workers to bend over backwards to serve
their clients or engage in discriminatory actions.5
The key to applying this insight to poll workers is
to specify which identities and beliefs are critical for
understanding the implementation of voter identifi-
cation requirements. We suggest the race of poll
workers and of voters is likely to be of critical
importance based on the history of voting rights in
the United States. Debates surrounding voter identi-
fication are also closely tied to the two major political
parties, suggesting that the partisanship of poll
workers will influence their implementation of voter
identification requirements. Finally, specific attitudes
about voter identification held by poll workers are
likely to influence implementation.
Barriers to electoral participation have been
justified as protecting the system against fraud
(Burnham 1965; Ginsburg 1986; Kleppner 1982;
McGerr 1986). Historically, these barriers were also
intended as a means of disenfranchising specific
groups of voters, such as certain immigrant groups,
African Americans, or the poor (Allen and Allen
1981; Burnham 1986; Keyssar 2000; Reynolds 1993),
although contemporary supporters of such laws
dispute these intentions. Therefore, the goal of
election reformers was not simply to prevent fraud
but also to disenfranchise voters. In the most noto-
rious example of procedural voter disenfranchise-
ment, blacks and immigrants were subject to literacy
tests prior to registration, disenfranchising many
otherwise eligible voters. After the passage of the
Voting Rights Act, voter rolls saw huge increases in
black and white registration (Alt 1994; Stanley 1987).
Today, variation in voter identification implementa-
tion may be seen as a method of intentional or even
unintentional intimidation used against certain types
of voters, especially minorities.
Hispanics in particular may be perceived as
a more likely group of voters who might be engaging
in fraud, given the larger immigration debate and
their perceived potential status as noncitizens. The
results of several studies have found that Hispanic
and African American voters were asked to show
physical forms of identification more than non-
Hispanic whites (Alvarez et al. 2010; Ansolabehere
2009; Atkeson et al. 2010; Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall
2010; Cobb et al. 2012). As the race or ethnicity of
voters has been shown to be key in the application of
voter identification requirements, it is also possible
the race of poll workers influences how they imple-
ment the law. Minority poll workers may be more
aware of this history and for the potential discrim-
inatory consequences of incorrectly applying voter
identification requirements.
H2: Minority poll workers will be less likely to ask for
photo identification compared to white poll workers.
Other factors may also be important to determining
if poll workers ask voters for photo identification.
The national debate surrounding voter identification
issues is highly partisan (Ansolabehere and Persily
2008), with Democrats focused on voter access and
the possibility of disenfranchising eligible voters who
may not have adequate identification and Republi-
cans focused on protecting the system against fraud
(Alvarez et al., N.d.; Ansolabehere and Persily 2008;
Liebschutz and Palazzolo 2005).
H3: Republican poll workers will be more likely to ask
for photo identification compared to Democratic or
Independent poll workers.
We also consider the important role that attitudes
may play in the implementation of voter identifica-
tion laws. Given the amount of discretion that poll
workers have in this realm, they may be motivated by
perceptions of the election process and the role that
voter identification plays in this process. For street-
level bureaucrats, the personal nature of the worker-
client interaction matters to the prescription of policy
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). However, poll
workers have minimal personal interaction with most
voters they encounter. A primary factor for their
implementation motivation may be normative—the
observed difference between what they believe voter
identification policies should be and the laws that are
5We observed a poll judge allowing a voter to vote an Election
Day ballot even though she had been provided an absentee ballot
and had been sent in, which was against the law.
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actually on the books. Because personal attitudes
towards multiple aspects of the election process may
shape discretionary behavior, it is likely that attitudes
about access to voting and photo identification
influence their implementation of voter identification
policies.
H4: Poll workers who are more concerned about the
integrity of elections will be more likely to ask for photo
identification than poll workers who are more con-
cerned about access to voting.
H5: Poll workers who support photo identification
policies will be more likely to ask for photo
identification.
Controlling Discretion
Given the discretion of street-level bureaucrats, there
has been much discussion of how to control it
(e.g., Meyers and Vorsanger 2003). Most scholars of
street-level bureaucracy recognize that supervisory
control is often weak and the promulgation of more
regulation has little or contradictory effects on the
extent of discretion. Since street-level bureaucrats
often make decisions based on their preferences, the
primary way to regulate discretion is by shaping these
preferences. Shaping the preferences of street-level
bureaucrats can be achieved through the develop-
ment of shared professional norms, adequate train-
ing, and the recruitment of capable individuals
(Brehm and Gates 1997, 202; Vinzant and Crothers
1998, 155–56).
Yet, poll workers differ from other street-level
workers in key ways. Because poll workers typically
undergo a quick training process and only work, at
most, a few days a year, they are less likely to have
a complete grasp of the rules and procedures com-
pared to other street-level bureaucrats. This lack of
knowledge means poll workers may have less in-
centive or ability to follow the prescribed rules and
procedures precisely because it is either too costly to
fully understand them or they may simply not be
aware that their own behavior is in direct contradic-
tion to the law.
Even though many poll workers work more than
one election,6 the infrequent nature of elections
means it is unlikely that experienced poll workers
fully retain their knowledge of election law and
procedure from election to election. It is also the
case that election laws and procedures change
dramatically between election cycles. In addition,
poll workers are temporary as opposed to career
street-level bureaucrats, and the inconsistent appli-
cation of rules will have no impact on their future
employment or career goals. Importantly, any
wrongdoing in the polling place likely has few or
no consequences. Except in extreme cases, poll
workers do not appear to be fined, reprimanded,
denied payment, or otherwise punished for inap-
propriate or illegal behavior. Therefore, it seems
very likely that poll workers are at increased risk of
relying on their normative values rather than their
training or the law in determining the procedures they
implement. In addition, poll workers are likely to
adopt their own procedures to make their job easier
during an election, especially if the formal rules are
complicated or difficult to implement or change in the
rules facilitates the election process (Lipsky 1980, 18;
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 12).7
Poll workers are typically required to attend
a training session prior to Election Day, during which
they are instructed in how to run a polling place,
including how to identify voters. Although New
Mexico law requires poll workers to attend a training
session, if poll workers do not show up on Election
Day, emergency replacements may be sent in, or
voters in line can be asked to serve as a poll worker.8
If training is effective, attending a training session
should be related to how well a poll worker is able to
implement voter identification requirements. In
addition, some poll workers receive more extensive
training than others. For example, in New Mexico,
presiding judges, the persons in charge of polling
places, are required to attend a more extensive
training than poll clerks, suggesting presiding
judges may be more likely to understand the voter
identification requirements and implement them
correctly.
H6: Poll workers who attended training will be more
likely to apply voter identification requirements cor-
rectly than poll workers who did not attend training.
H7: Presiding judges will be more likely to apply voter
identification requirements correctly compared to elec-
tion clerks.
However, our own observations of poll worker
training in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, suggest
6See footnote 4.
7Our data show that 17% of poll workers indicated they asked for
identification because they had trouble hearing or found it easier
to read their name from the ID card.
8We observed several recruitments during our 2008 Election Day
observations.
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training may not be effective, and the individual
beliefs of poll workers may more accurately explain
variation in the implementation of voter identifica-
tion policies.9 The poll-worker training sessions
typically lasted one to two hours, depending on
whether it was a training session for presiding judges
(longer) or for election clerks (shorter). Training
took place anywhere from a few days to a few weeks
before Election Day, which suggests many poll work-
ers may have forgotten some of the more intricate
details of election law. All poll workers were given
a manual to study and bring with them to the
polling place. There was no incentive to ensure poll
workers read or understood the manual, although
we did observe many poll workers and presiding
judges consulting the manual on Election Day when
various issues arose. There were no poll-worker
performance tests, online training, or hands-on learning
opportunities.
During training, county officials in charge of the
training explained to all poll workers the complicated
voter identification law, stressing that it is the voter’s
choice as to how they authenticate themselves to the
election workers. However, trainers would preface
their explanation of the law by stating their awareness
that some poll workers did not agree with the law,
but that poll workers were to follow the law on
Election Day. In addition, in nearly all of the training
sessions, some poll workers voiced their disagreement
with the voter identification law directly to the
county officials during discussion.
Furthermore, unlike other street-level workers,
poll workers rarely enter their job with a group of
knowledgeable and experienced coworkers and may
not benefit from learning about the rules and
procedures from other poll workers. Poll workers
are extremely unlikely to develop an organizational
culture with shared professional norms to guide their
conduct as is common with other street-level bureau-
crats. However, some individuals who serve as poll
workers through multiple elections may be especially
committed to the job and thus have developed a set
of norms that would encourage them to correctly
apply voter identification requirements. Alternatively,
however, experience could make them more confi-
dent in making their own decisions and increase poll-
worker voter identification discretion.
H8: Poll workers who have more experience working
previous elections should be more likely to follow
election law.
An important way to control discretion among
street-level bureaucrats is through the recruitment
process. For example, street-level bureaucrats who are
more highly educated may more effectively exercise
their discretion in a positive way (Vinzant and
Crothers 1998, 155). Extending this logic to poll
workers, a poll worker’s level of education may be
related to their ability to correctly implement election
law and voter identification requirements. Since voter
identification requirements are complicated in New
Mexico, we expect poll workers with higher levels of
education will be more likely to understand and
follow the law relating to voter identification.
H9: More educated poll workers will be less likely to ask
for photo identification.
Data and Methodology
The primary source of data for this study come from
a post-election random survey of poll workers in four
New Mexico counties (Bernalillo, Santa Fe, San Juan,
and Don˜a Ana) after the November 2008 general
election.10 In New Mexico, the poll workers in each
precinct are part of a precinct board, headed by
a presiding judge who has special training in the
management of the election. Presiding judges are
responsible for the conduct of the election in their
precinct and therefore are the poll workers most
likely to engage the voter and the precinct system at
all possible points. Therefore, we included each pre-
siding judge in the four counties we examined in our
sample to have adequate data on all aspects of the
election process in the precinct.11 We also randomly
selected two additional members of the precinct
board—poll clerks—from every precinct in each
county to include in the sample. In Bernalillo
County, we also selected an additional two sample
members from each precinct.12
9Each author of this article as well as most members of our
observation team went to at least one training session in
Bernalillo, New Mexico. Our discussions with and observations
of poll workers in the other counties on Election Day suggest that
our experience in Bernalillo County was general.
10See the online supplemental Appendix S1 for a detailed
description of our research design.
11Technically, there are three poll-worker positions: the presiding
judge, the election judge, and the clerk. However, only the
presiding-judge position differs from the others in training and
duties.
12We did this because Bernalillo County had about two addi-
tional poll workers per precinct.
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After the election, the local county clerk sent each
sampled poll worker an invitation letter informing
them of the upcoming survey encouraging their
participation. The surveys were mailed on January
12, 2009, and we continued accepting returned and
completed surveys until April 30, 2009. We sent
a reminder postcard on January 29, 2009 to those
individuals who had not responded. All individuals
who had not returned a survey by February 18, 2009
were mailed a new survey, and a second follow-up
reminder postcard was mailed on March 1. The
overall response rate was 69.1% using Response Rate
2 of the American Association of Public Opinion
Research (AAPOR 2011).
In addition to the poll-worker survey data, we
use two other data sources to test our hypotheses.
First, we use a probability-based post-election mixed
mode (Internet or mail) survey of New Mexico voters
to ascertain whether voters were identified in
accordance with the law (Atkeson, Adams, and
Alvarez, n.d.). We use these data to determine whether
the poll-worker responses toward identification of
voters reflect the voter experience during the same
election. Second, we use Election Day precinct obser-
vation reports in the same four New Mexico counties
studied in the poll-worker survey during the same
election (See Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2010 and
Appendix S1). Each county had at least two teams of
two individuals trained in polling-place operations
fill out observations reports across a wide variety of
precincts. Using this data provides a further measure-
ment check on the poll-worker and voter-survey data
(Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2013).
Dependent Variable
To test voter identification implementation behavior,
we asked, ‘‘When a voter approached without any
form of identification, how often did you ask voters
to show a form of photo identification?’’ Response
choices included: ‘‘very often’’ (16.4%), ‘‘somewhat
often’’ (19.4%), ‘‘not too often’’ (35.2%), and ‘‘not at
all’’ (29.0%).13 Asking for photo identification is the
most restrictive form of identification a poll worker
can ask from a voter and is also contrary to New
Mexico election law. This ordinal dependent variable
is coded on a 4-point scale from ‘‘not at all’’ (coded
1) to ‘‘very often’’ (coded ‘‘4’’). The mean response
to this question was 2.23. Although a majority of
poll workers do not ask for photo identification
‘‘somewhat’’ or ‘‘very often,’’ 36% of poll workers
indicate they asked voters for photo identification
consistently. This initial descriptive result suggests
that poll workers engage in discretion and that poll
workers vary in the type of identification they require
from voters.
Independent Variables
We use four groups of independent variables: parti-
sanship, political attitudes, variables that capture the
training, position, and experience of the poll worker,
and demographic characteristics. We include poll-
worker partisanship, coded as a series of dummy
variables, with dichotomous measures for Republican
and independent poll workers and Democrats as the
excluded category.
We measure poll-worker attitudes toward voter
identification with two variables.14 The first is a ques-
tion that asked poll workers to choose which state-
ment is more important, ‘‘Ensuring that everyone
who is eligible has the right to vote’’ or ‘‘Protecting
the voting system against fraud.’’ Nearly two-thirds
(63%) of poll workers indicated it was more impor-
tant to ensure the right to vote than to protect the
system against fraud (27%). Ensuring everyone has
the right to vote is coded ‘‘1,’’ and thus we expect
a negative relationship because those who think
ensuring the right to vote is more important will be
less likely to ask for photo identification. We also
control for those respondents who answered ‘‘don’t
know’’ (10%) to this question to prevent modeling
problems that would otherwise occur because of
listwise deletion.
For the second attitudinal variable, we asked each
poll worker to ‘‘indicate whether you strongly agree,
somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, some-
what disagree, or strongly disagree with the following
statement: Photo identification should be required of
each voter at the polls to prevent fraud.’’ The variable
is coded on a 5-point Likert scale with ‘‘strongly
agree’’ coded as ‘‘5’’ and ‘‘strongly disagree’’ coded as
‘‘1.’’ We find that poll workers overwhelmingly
support photo identification policies; 52.9% of poll
workers strongly agreed with this statement, along
with another 19.7% who somewhat agreed, 10.8%
who neither agreed nor disagreed, 7.1% who some-
what disagreed, and 9.5% who strongly disagreed.
13Frequency percentages are weighted by age, county, and pre-
cinct position.
14In previous versions of this article, we included various
measures that captured poll-worker attitudes towards the prev-
alence of fraud. Inclusion of these variables did not produce
statistically or substantively interesting results or effect on the
results presented here.
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We measure training with a dummy variable for
those who attended one or more training sessions
(coded ‘‘0’’) and those that did not attend a training
session (coded ‘‘1’’).15 We also capture those poll
workers who worked early voting with a dummy
variable.
We measure experience by the number of pre-
vious elections worked coded on a continuous scale
from ‘‘1’’ to ‘‘10 or more.’’ A separate dummy
variable is also included for those individuals who
worked their first election in 2008. We also include
a variable that measures the poll worker’s position,
with presiding judges coded ‘‘1,’’ and all other poll
workers coded ‘‘0.’’
Our final set of independent variables is demo-
graphic characteristics. We include poll-worker self-
identified ethnicity coded as a series of dummy
variables. These include Hispanic, black, Native
Americans, and other minorities (this includes Asians
and ‘‘other’’). A majority of our respondents were
white (53%), but 30% identified as Hispanic; about
4% were Native American, and about 2% were black.
Education is coded on an 8-point scale from some
high school to advanced graduate work. A dummy
variable is included for female poll workers, and age
is coded in years. We have no a priori expectations
for either gender or age in our models.
Election administration is managed at the county
level and, therefore, we use county fixed effects:
three county dummies (San Juan, Don˜a Ana, and
Santa Fe counties) in our model, with Bernalillo
County (the largest in New Mexico) being the
comparison county.16
Results
Variation in Implementation of the
Voter Identification Law
We first present information drawn from observa-
tional data to provide confirming evidence of the
variable application of voter identification laws at the
polls in the 2008 election and to provide contextual
information on our case. The Election Day observa-
tions confirm the discretion available to poll workers
in identifying voters. We even saw a variety of voter
identification rules being used within precincts across
different voters. Members of the observation team
witnessed the following procedures: (1) voters vol-
unteered identification (picture or other type of
identification card, especially voter registration cards)
without being asked by the poll workers; (2) voters
were told to look up their name in the voter
identification roll and provide their corresponding
number to the poll workers without showing any
additional identification; (3) voters were asked for
their name only or their name with either address or
birth year, but not all three; (4) voters were asked
correctly for their name, address, and year of birth;
(5) voters were immediately asked for identification,
sometimes picture identification, upon arrival;
(6) voters were recognized upon entering the polling
site and asked to sign the voter rolls; (7) voters who
could not be found in the precinct roll were then asked
for identification so that the poll workers could call the
county clerk and request registration status and the
correct voter precinct; (8) poll workers simply held out
their hand presumably with the expectation that an
individual’s identification would be placed in it.
Data from our convenience observations indi-
cated that about one-quarter of precincts we visited
were asking for a physical form of voter identifica-
tion. In addition, only three in five (61%) precincts
were asking for identification properly (Atkeson,
Alvarez, and Hall 2010).
Because many voters may have not been asked for
identification but instead just offered the poll-worker
identification, it is important to probe this issue
further from the voter’s perspective. In the voter
survey, respondents were asked the following two-
part question: ‘‘When you went to vote were you
ASKED to show PHOTO-identification, like a driver’s
license, did you just provide a PHOTO-ID to the poll
worker without them asking or were you identified in
some other way?’’ Respondents who said ‘‘some other
way’’ in response to that first question were asked
a follow-up question with a list of choices: ‘‘If you
were not asked to show photo-identification or did
not just automatically provide identification to the
poll worker, how were you identified at the polls? Did
you: show your voter registration card, state your
name, state your name and address, state your name
and birth year, state your name, address and birth
year, I wrote my name, address and birth year on
a piece of paper, or I did it another way.’’
These responses were collapsed so that voters were
classified as being identified correctly or incorrectly.
The results demonstrate that the law was often not
15Only 48 poll workers in our sample indicated they did not
attend training.
16When we were not able to identify the poll worker’s county, we
included them with the mode, Bernalillo County. The results are
the same if these cases are deleted through listwise deletion.
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applied correctly. Just under half of all voters (49%)
were identified correctly, and just over half 51% were
not identified correctly.
These results varied by whether a voter voted at an
early voting site or on Election Day. A minority of
Election Day voters (40%) were identified correctly
but a majority of early voters (54%) were identified
correctly (p , .05, two tailed test). We also examine
how this identification law was applied across His-
panic and non-Hispanic voters. Data on early voting
indicated that self-identified Hispanics and non-His-
panics were identified correctly or incorrectly equally.
However, this was not the case in precincts on
Election Day. A little over half (52%) of self-identified
non-Hispanics were identified correctly but only 41%
of self-identified Hispanics were identified correctly
(p , .05, two tailed test). These results provide
support for our first hypothesis that poll workers are
less likely to incorrectly identify voters during early
voting compared to Election Day.
Implementation of Voter Identification by
Poll Workers
To determine how attitudes, identities, training, and
experience influence poll-worker behavior, we turn to
our poll-worker survey. Models 1 and 2 in Table 1
examine poll-worker behavior, with the dependent
variable being how often the poll worker asked voters
to show a form of photo identification. Model 1
TABLE 1 Ordered Logit Regression: Why Poll Workers Ask for Photo Identification
Model 1 Model 2
b SE b SE
Race/Ethnicity
Hispanic 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.12
Black 0.49 0.30 0.42 0.30
Native American 0.38 0.23 0.26 0.23
Other -0.44 0.27 -0.35 0.27
Attitudes
Independent -0.02 0.19 -0.16 0.19
Republican 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.11
Ensure right to vote -0.03 0.11 0.17 0.11
Ensure don’t know 0.00 0.23 0.14 0.23
Photo ID attitudes 0.33* 0.04
Training and Experience
No training 0.32 0.38 0.18 0.38
First election 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.14
Number of elections worked 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
Presiding judge -0.10 0.11 -0.09 0.12
Worked early voting -0.10 0.27 -0.18 0.27
Demographics
Education -0.15* 0.03 -0.12* 0.03
Female -0.17 0.11 -0.19 0.11
Age -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
San Juan -0.10 0.18 0.01 0.18
Don˜a Ana 0.25 0.16 0.18 0.16
Santa Fe -0.61* 0.17 -0.54* 0.17
Cut 1 -1.85 0.33 -0.51 0.37
Cut 2 -0.29 0.33 1.11 0.37
Cut 3 0.81 0.33 2.24 0.38
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.04
LR Chi2 84.32* 152.75*
Brant test Chi2 27.59 33.75
Brant test p.chi2 0.89 0.75
N 1517 1517
Note: Dependent variable: 4-point scale from the question, ‘‘How often did you ask voters to show a form of photo identification?’’
Models do not violate the parallel regression assumption according to the Brant test. *p , .05 two-tailed test.
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presents the potential determinants of whether or not
poll workers asked for photo identification, and
Model 2 presents the same analysis except we also
include the poll-worker attitudes toward photo iden-
tification. We use an ordered logit regression in our
analysis, with the variable coded from 1 (‘‘not at all’’)
to 4 (‘‘very often’’). To simplify the discussion of the
effect of these variables, we use Clarify (King, Tomz,
and Wittenberg 2000) to generate the predicted
probability of how each factor changes the probabil-
ity of support for the dependent variable for a hypo-
thetical poll worker.
Overall, we do not find much support for many
of the hypotheses. In Model 1, we find some weak but
contradictory evidence that black poll workers were
more likely to ask for photo identification compared
to white poll workers (p , .10, two-tailed test), but
this effect disappears in Model 2 once we account for
attitudes about photo identification. We also find
some confirming evidence that Republican poll
workers were more likely to ask for photo identifica-
tion compared to Democratic poll workers (p , .10,
two-tailed test), but again, this effect disappears once
we account for attitudes about photo identification.
In both models, we find no support that poll-worker
attitudes about election integrity and access to voting
influence their behavior. Finally, we find little sup-
port to suggest that training, experience working
elections, serving as a presiding judge, or working
early voting have a strong influence on asking for
photo identification, although the direction of the
effects are in the expected direction.
However, we do find significant support for two
of our hypotheses, namely attitudes about photo
identification and the poll worker’s level of educa-
tion. Figure 1 plots the predicted probability the
median poll worker will not ask for photo identifi-
cation (i.e., responded ‘‘not at all’’ to the survey) with
95% confidence intervals based on their attitudes
towards photo identification. For the median poll
worker who strongly disagrees with requiring photo
identification of voters, there is a 0.51 probability
they will not ask for photo identification and only
a 0.06 probability they will ask for photo identifica-
tion very often. As the poll worker increasingly
supports photo identification, the probability they
will not ask for photo identification decreases. The
median poll worker who strongly agrees with photo
identification has a 0.22 probability of not asking for
photo identification and a 0.18 probability of asking
for photo identification very often. Substantively,
these results suggest that individual attitudes have
a strong influence on poll-worker discretion and
support our theory that poll workers, when provided
with discretion, will likely fall back on their norma-
tive judgment of the policy they are required to
implement, rather than strictly follow set procedures.
Yet, we see that education moderates the effect of
attitudes toward voter identification. Figure 2 plots
the predicted probability the median poll worker
FIGURE 1 Influence of Attitudes about Photo Identification on Asking for Photo Identification
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never asked voters for photo identification with 95%
confidence intervals, based on the results in Model 2.
Voters with higher levels of education are less likely
to ask for photo identification. The median poll
worker with a two-year college degree has a 0.22
probability of not asking for photo identification,
compared to a 0.17 probability for poll workers with
some high school and a 0.32 probability for poll
workers with advanced graduate work. The results
suggest for a poll worker with high education and
strong attitudes toward photo identification, the poll
worker’s positive desire to ask for identification
would be balanced by her education and concomitant
recognition that applying her attitudes is not appro-
priate. Having a better-educated class of workers
would seem to be important in ensuring that the
poll workers do not rely on their normative judg-
ments. Equally important, this education cannot be
provided by the local election officials through train-
ing. There is something about educational attainment
for which training alone is not a substitute.
Finally, we see that poll workers in Santa Fe
County were less likely to ask for photo identifica-
tion than other county poll workers in both Models
1 and 2.17 This last finding is consistent with our
Election Day poll observations where we saw that
poll workers in Santa Fe were more likely to
implement voter identification policies correctly,
although it is not clear what explains this finding.
Conclusions
Who asks for photo identification from voters? The
answer seems to be poll workers who believe it should
be required. In general, it seems when poll workers
are given substantial discretion in the application of
voter identification requirements, they tend to rely on
their own attitudes and beliefs rather than the law
and their training. In the case of federal elections in
New Mexico, where the voter identification require-
ments are complicated and poll workers must accept
many forms of identification, it appears that some
poll workers ignore the law and instead rely on their
feelings and attitudes about the way voter identifica-
tion should be administered. A voter identification
law that substantially reduces the amount of discre-
tion available to poll workers is likely to reduce the
influence of individual attitudes. For example, during
early voting in Bernalillo County, when voters ap-
proached the polling place they were asked to fill out
a card with their name, address, and birth year. Poll
workers used this card to look up the voter to ensure
they received the proper ballot. This process is
much less open to discretionary identification of
voters. Similarly formulated processes may reduce
FIGURE 2 Influence of Education on Asking for Photo Identification
17Santa Fe poll workers were significantly less likely to ask for
photo identification compared to poll workers in each of the
other three counties, and poll workers in Don˜a Ana and San Juan
did not behave significantly different from each other.
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poll-worker discretion in this process. In addition, we
observed the 2009 Albuquerque city elections where
photo identification was required of voters for the
first time. In our observations, we found poll workers
consistently asked for photo identification as required
by law and saw little of the variation that was
observed in the 2008 elections (Atkeson et al.
2010b).18 Our work highlights the importance of
implementing clear voter identification procedures
that are easy to follow from the poll worker’s point of
view and are also clearly communicated to voters
when they enter the polling place.
However, implementing photo identification
laws at the state level does not address the underlying
problem we are concerned with here. The motivation
for this study was to understand why poll workers
were inconsistently applying voter identification
requirements, which disproportionately impacted
minority groups. Fundamentally, we are concerned
with how identification requirements influence every
individual’s equal access to the voting booth. Poll
workers who are allowed to engage in discretion may
deny equal access to the voting booth in New Mexico
and across the country. Studies like ours are needed
in other states to ascertain how procedures that can
deny an otherwise eligible voter their right to
exercise their franchise are being implemented in
polling places, including not only voter identifica-
tion requirements but other procedures like pro-
visional balloting. Studies also need to determine if
such discretion has negative implications for voter
turnout.
There are also a number of important implications
from these findings beyond policy prescriptions for
voter identification requirements. First, previous studies
of voter confidence in the accuracy of election out-
comes suggest that the voter/poll-worker interaction is
a significant factor in explaining levels of voter confi-
dence (Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Hall, Monson, and
Patterson 2009). One reason for this finding may be the
discretion available to poll workers in providing access
to the ballot (see also Claassen et al. 2008). Further-
more, there is some research that finds that voter
confidence can influence turnout (Alvarez, Hall, and
Llewellyn 2008; Kerevel 2009), suggesting that poll-
worker discretion can have substantial consequences for
voters. Second, previous research has suggested certain
groups of voters may be disproportionately impacted
by poll-worker discretion in the application of voter
identification laws (Ansolabehere 2009; Atkeson et al.
2010; Cobb et al. 2012; Page and Pitts 2009). If poll
workers can use their discretion to discriminate against
particular voters, as feared by Page and Pitts (2009),
policy makers may wish to consider election reforms
that restrict the ability of poll workers to use their own
discretion in deciding what type of identification to
accept from voters. Clear guidelines and procedures
that prevent poll workers from using their discretion
are likely the best way for this to be achieved.19
Finally, our research has implications for theories
of street-level bureaucracy. Specifically, we show that
while training, experience, and culture may matter
for restraining typical street-level bureaucrats like
teachers and police officers, these factors appear
unimportant for temporary street-level bureaucrats
such as poll workers. For temporary workers who
lack the infrastructure and organizational norms that
come from permanent employment, our research
suggests that attitudes are of primary importance,
and therefore election administrators need to be
responsive to this problem by creating procedures
that encourage responsiveness to the law.
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